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Fault tree analysis for nuclear power plant probabilistic safety assessment is an intricate process. 
Personal computer-based software systems have therefore been developed to conduct this analysis. 
However, all existing fault tree analysis software systems only accept quantitative data to 
characterized basic event reliabilities. In real-world applications, basic event reliabilities may not be 
represented by quantitative data but by qualitative justifications. The motivation of this work is to 
develop an intelligent system by fuzzy reliability algorithm in fault tree analysis, which can accept 
not only quantitative data but also qualitative information to characterized reliabilities of basic 
events. In this paper, a newly-developed system called InFaTAS-NuSA is presented and its main 
features and capabilities are discussed. To benchmark the applicability of the intelligent concept 
implemented in InFaTAS-NuSA, a case study is performed and the analysis results are compared to 
the results obtained from a well-known fault tree analysis software package. The results confirm that 
the intelligent concept implemented in InFaTAS-NuSA can be very useful to complement 
conventional fault tree analysis software systems. 
Keywords: Fault tree analysis; probabilistic safety assessment; nuclear power plant; fuzzy reliability 
algorithm; InFaTAS-NuSA. 
1.   Introduction 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) provides a comprehensive and structured approach to identify 
and understand key plant vulnerabilities, to develop accident scenarios, to assess the level 
of plant safety, and to derive numerical estimates of potential risks.[1-3] It has been used in 
the last two decades to study the level I probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of nuclear 
power plants (NPPs).[4-6] 
 Due to the complexity of FTA, a number of personal computer-based software 
systems have been developed. Two well-known FTA software packages in NPP PSA are 
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Probabilistic Safety Analysis PACKage (PSAPACK)[7-9] and Systems Analysis Programs 
for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE).[10-15] PSAPACK was 
developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in cooperation with its 
Member States.[16] Meanwhile, SAPHIRE was developed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission at the Idaho National Laboratory.[17] These two packages can only accept 
numerical values to represent basic event reliability characteristics.[16, 18] However, in 
real-world applications, reliabilities of some basic events may not be characterized by 
quantitative data but by qualitative linguistic terms.[19-21] Therefore, the motivation of this 
study is to develop an intelligent FTA system, which can accept qualitative linguistic 
terms to characterize reliabilities of basic events, to complement conventional FTA for 
NPP PSA. This intelligent system called InFaTAS-NuSA is realized by implementing a 
set of seven failure possibilities and a set of seven membership functions of triangular 
fuzzy numbers, which have been developed in Purba et al.[22], to deal with basic events 
whose reliabilities cannot be characterized by quantitative data. An area defuzzification 
technique, which has been developed in Purba et al.[23], is then used to decode triangular 
fuzzy numbers into a single numerical value. To benchmark the applicability of 
InFaTAS-NuSA, a case study on an NPP PSA is performed and the results are compared 
to the results of the same system generated by SAPHIRE. There are two aspects of 
originalities of InFaTAS-NuSA: (1) an introduction of the set of seven failure 
possibilities and the set of seven triangular fuzzy numbers into the quantitative analysis 
phase of conventional FTA; and (2) an implementation of a fuzzy reliability algorithm to 
integrate qualitative information with quantitative data. Furthermore, InFaTAS-NuSA 
exhibits two advantages: (1) it enables experts to qualitatively evaluate basic event 
reliability characteristics based on their expertise, working experiences and scientific 
intuition; and (2) it enables safety analysts to generate basic event probabilities from 
qualitative information provided by experts. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes new features 
implemented in InFaTAS-NuSA. The fuzzy reliability algorithm to generate basic event 
probabilities from qualitative information is given in Section 3. Section 4 describes a 
real-world application to be evaluated by InFaTAS-NuSA. The applicability of InFaTAS-
NuSA for NPP PSA are then analyzed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the 
paper and briefly describes further research directions. 
2.   InFaTAS-NuSA New Features 
The basic structure of InFaTAS-NuSA is shown in Fig. 1. It takes three different types of 
inputs and generates four different types of outputs.  




Fig. 1. Basic structure of InFaTAS-NuSA. 
 New features which are implemented in InFaTAS-NuSA to make it different from 
conventional FTA system are as follows. 
2.1.   Basic Event Failure Possibility Distribution 
A set of seven qualitative linguistic terms has been developed in Purba et al.[22] to scale 
basic event failure possibilities from the less likely to the most likely occurrences as 
denoted in (1). 
 { | 1, 2, ,7} {  , ,  , ,  , ,  }ih i very low low reasonably low moderate reasonably high high v i hH ery h g= … ==  (1) 
 Those seven failure possibilities in (1) and their corresponding failure likelihood 
values are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Basic event failure likelihood values. 
Basic event failure possibilities Failure likelihood values 
very low < 1.0E-8 
low 1.0E-8 – 1.0E-7 
reasonably low 1.0E-7 – 1.0E-6 
moderate 1.0E-6 – 1.0E-5 
reasonably high 1.0E-5 – 1.0E-4 
high 1.0E-4 – 1.0E-3 
very high > 1.0E-3 
2.2.   Failure Possibility Membership Functions 
A set of seven membership function of triangular fuzzy numbers has been developed in 
Purba et al.[22] to mathematically represent those seven basic event qualitative failure 
possibilities in (1) as denoted in (2-8). 
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2.3.   Weighted Average Aggregation 
A weighted average aggregation in (9) is used to aggregate experts’ subjective 
justifications.[24] 
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where bk is the kth basic event of a set of basic events (B) of a fault tree (FT) being 
evaluated as denoted in (10) and ej is the jth expert of a set of experts (E) involved to 
evaluate B as denoted in (11). Meanwhile, jeµ is a membership function of triangular 
fuzzy numbers in (2-8) given by expert ej to basic event bk, jew is a credibility weight of  
expert ej as denoted in (12) and n is a number of experts. 
  { }| 1, 2,3, ,B b i li= = … and B FT∈  (10) 
  { }, , ,1 2E e e en= ⋯  (11) 




W w w w w w
n i i i
  




⋯  (12) 
2.4.   Area Defuzzification Technique 
An area defuzzification technique has been developed in Purba et al.[23] to decode a 
membership function of fuzzy numbers into a failure possibility score (Rs) in NPP PSA 
involving fuzzy concepts. Rs of a membership function of triangular fuzzy numbers is 
calculated as in (13). 
  ( )( ) ( )1 4 1 2 318R ADT x x x xs µ= = + +  (13) 
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where x1, x2 and x3 are the numerical values of the parameters of the membership function 
( ) ( )1 2 3, ,x x x xµ =  
2.5.   Onisawa’s Logarithmic Function 
An Onisawa’s logarithmic function is to generate a failure probability (R) for each basic 















where (1/ 3)[(1 ) / ] 2.301m R R
s s
= − ×  and Rs is a failure possibility score generated in 
(13). 
2.6.   Minimal Cut Set Importance Measure 
A cut set of a fault tree is a set of fault events if they occur together can cause the top 
event to occur. Meanwhile, a minimal cut set is a cut set that has been reduced into the 
minimum number of fault events to cause the top event to occur.[25, 26] A minimal cut set 
importance measure is a measure used to assess how far a minimal cut set contributes to 
the failure of the top event[25, 27], which can be evaluated using (15). 





= ×  (15) 
where % imcs  is the contribution percentage of the i
th
 minimal cut set,  P
mcsi
 is the 
failure probability of the ith minimal cut set as in (16), and PT  is the overall probability 









where bj is a basic event in the mcsi and n is the number of basic event in mcsi. 





= − −∏  
 =  
 (17) 
where m is the number of minimal cut sets of the fault tree under evaluation.  
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2.7.   Basic Event Fussell-Vesely Importance Evaluation 
A Fussell-Vesely importance is a measure to evaluate how far a basic event contributes to 
the failure of the top event, which can be evaluated using (18). 





= − −∏  
 =  
 (18) 
where b is the basic event to be evaluated,  PT  is the overall probability of the top event 
as in (17),  ( )Pmcs bi
 is the probability of the ith minimal cut set containing the basic 
event b, and n is the number of minimal cut sets containing the basic event b. 
2.8.   Top Event Sensitivity Analysis 
Top event sensitivity is analysed by generating a lower bound and an upper bound failure 
possibilities for each basic event. The lower bound failure possibility is generated using 
the lowest grade of failure possibility justified by the experts. Meanwhile, the upper 
bound failure possibility is generated using the highest grade of failure possibility 
justified by the experts. For example, if the failure possibilities of the basic event A are 
subjectively justified by five experts as {low, reasonably low, low, moderate, low}, then 
the lower bound failure possibility is generated using this set of failure possibilities 
“{low, low, low, low, low}” and the upper bound failure possibility is generated using this 
set of failure possibilities “(moderate, moderate, moderate, moderate, moderate}”. Those 
lower and upper failure possibilities are then used to generate the failure probability 
range of the top event to find a sensitivity spectrum of the top event to the variations of 
the experts’ subjective justifications. 
3.   Fuzzy Reliability Algorithm 
A fuzzy reliability algorithm to generate a probability of a basic event of system fault 
trees from a qualitative failure possibility is as follows. 
 WHILE still basic event bi  
  IF bi  has historical failure probability distribution 
   Enter its lower bound, best estimate and upper bound failure probabilities 
  ELSE 
   WHILE still experts e j  
    Read failure possibility 
e bj ihk  given by the expert e j  
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  Find the left endpoint 1
e j
x k , the core 2
e j
x k and the right endpoint 3
e j
x k  of 
the corresponding membership function kµ  
     IF 1
e bj ih hk =  THEN 0.00; 0.04; 0.081 2 3
e e ej j j
x x xk k k= = =  
     ELSE IF 2
e bj ih hk =  THEN 0.07; 0.13; 0.191 2 3
e e ej j j
x x xk k k= = =   
     ELSE IF 3
e bj ih hk = THEN 0.17; 0.27; 0.371 2 3
e e ej j j
x x xk k k= = =   
     ELSE IF 4
e bj ih hk =  THEN 0.35; 0.50; 0.651 2 3
e e ej j j
x x xk k k= = =   
     ELSE IF 5
e bj ih hk =  THEN 0.63; 0.73; 0.831 2 3
e e ej j j
x x xk k k= = =   
     ELSE IF 6
e bj ih hk =  THEN 0.81; 0.87; 0.931 2 3
e e ej j j
x x xk k k= = =   
     ELSE IF 7
e bj ih hk =  THEN 0.92; 0.96; 1.001 2 3
e e ej j j
x x xk k k= = =   
  END WHILE 
  Calculate the final membership function ( ) ( ), ,1 2 3bi x x x xµ =  
   FOR l = 1 to 3 




x w xl j lkk j
 =
 = ×∑ ∑
 
= =  
  
   END FOR 
  Calculate the bi  event failure possibility score 
biRS  
   ( )1 4 1 2 318biR x x xs = + +  
  Calculate the bi  event failure probability 
biR  
   IF  0
biRS =  THEN  0
biR =  

















 END WHILE 
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4.   A Real-World Application 
The first model of a reactor protection system (RPS) of the Combustion Engineering 
pressurized water reactor (PWR) is applied to verify the effectiveness and applicability of 
the new features introduced into InFaTAS-NuSA to overcome the limitation of 
conventional FTA. 
4.1.   Problem Description 
The RPS is one of many safety systems in nuclear power plants, which is designed to 
perform safe shutdown of the reactor by inserting control rod clusters into the reactor 
core to immediately terminate nuclear reaction, so that heat generation in the core can be 
eliminated. With the help of other safety systems, the integrity of the fuel and the reactor 
coolant pressure boundary can be maintained. 
 The Combustion Engineering RPS comprises numerous electronic and mechanical 
components to produce an automatic and manual rapid reactor trip. The first model of 
this RPS consists of four channels to measure parameter plants, six trip matrices to trip 
the reactor trip switch gear, trip breakers to interrupt power to the control element 
assembly drive mechanism (CEDM) allowing gravity to insert the control rod assembly 
into the reactor core, and a group of control rods, which will be de-energized on 
successful RPS actuation. The simplified diagram of the Combustion Engineering RPS is 
shown in Fig. 2. The failure of this system has been evaluated using SAPHIRE and the 
results are well documented in Wierman et al.[13]. 




Fig. 2. Simplified diagram of the Combustion Engineering RPS Group 1.[13] 
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4.2.   Basic Event Failure Possibility Evaluation 
To demonstrate the integration of quantitative data with qualitative information, basic 
events of the Combustion Engineering RPS group 1 are classified into two groups. The 
first group is a set of basic events whose reliability characteristics are individually and 
subjectively evaluated by experts using the seven failure possibilities in (1). This set of 
basic events is shown in Table 2. To illustrate the quantification process of the algorithm 
described in Section 3, let us assume that seven experts of the same level of expertise 
about the Combustion Engineering RPS have been selected and their evaluations are 
given in Table 4.  We need to note that those justification results shown in Table 4 are 
just of illustrative character of experts to obtain the closest matching failure probabilities 
to the known best estimate values, which are generated through simulation. Meanwhile, 
the second group is a set of basic events whose probabilities are available. This set of 
basic events is given in Table 3.  
Table 2. A set of basic events whose reliability characteristics is evaluated by experts. 
Basic event name Description 
CE1-CBI-FF-PA,B,C,D 
CE1-CBI-FF-TA,B,C,D Channel trip unit (bi-stable) fails to trip at its set point 
CE1-CPA-FF-TA,B,C,D Channel analog core protection calculator fails to send a signal to the trip 
unit 
CE1-CPR-FF-PA,B,C,D Channel reactor vessel pressure sensor/ transmitter fails to detect a high 
pressure and sends a signal to the trip unit 
CE1-CTP-FF-CTA,B,C,D 
CE1-CTP-FF-HTA,B,C,D 
Channel reactor vessel temperature/ transmitter (cold or hot leg) fails to 
detect a low level and sends a signal to the trip unit 
CE1-MSW-FF-MT1,2 Manual scram switch fails to operate upon demand 
CE1-RYL-FF-LA,B,C,D–1,2,3,4 Channel logic relay fails to de-energize upon demand 
CE1-RYT-FF-ICM1,2,3,4 Trip system trip relay fails to de-energize upon demand 
CE1-CBI-CF-P(T)2OF3TM Common cause failure specific 2 of 3 bi-stables associated with either a 
pressure (P) or temperature (T) signal (T&M) 
CE1-CBI-CF-P(T)3OF4 Common cause failure specific 3 of 4 bi-stables associated with either a 
pressure (P) or temperature (T) signal 
CE1-CBI-CF-4OF6TM Common cause failure specific 4 of 6 bi-stables (T&M) 
CE1-CBI-CF-6OF8 Common cause failure specific 6 of 8 bi-stables 
CE1-CPA-CF-T2OF3TM Common cause failure 2 of 3 analog core protection calculators (T&M) 
CE1-CPA-CF-T3OF4 Common cause failure 3 of 4 analog core protection calculators 
CE1-CPR-CF-P2OF3TM Common cause failure 2 of 3 pressure sensor/ transmitters (T&M) 
CE1-CPR-CF-P3OF4 Common cause failure 3 of 4 pressure sensor/ transmitters 
CE1-CTP-CF-C(H)T2OF3TM Common cause failure 2 of 3 temperature sensor/ transmitters (T&M) 
CE1-CTP-CF-C(H)T3OF4 Common cause failure 3 of 4 temperature sensor/ transmitters 
CE1-ROD-CF-RODS Common cause failure 20% or more CRD/rods fail to insert 
CE1-RYL-CF-LM6OF12TM Common cause failure specific 6 of 12 logic relays (T&M) 
CE1-RYL-CF-LM12OF24 Common cause failure specific 12 of 24 logic relays 
CE1-RYL-CF-1,2,3,4LM3OF3TM Common cause failure 3 of 3 logic relays (T&M) 
CE1-RYL-CF-1,2,3,4LM6OF6 Common cause failure 6 of 6 logic relays 
CE1-RYT-CF-TR2OF4 
CE1-RYT-CF-2OF4 Common cause failure 2 of 4 trip relays 
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Table 3. A set of basic events whose probabilities is available. 








/CE1-RPS-TM-CHA RPS channel A NOT in test and maintenance 9.68E-1 9.8E-1 1.0 
CE1-RPS-TM-CHA RPS channel A in test and maintenance 0.0 1.6E-2 3.2E-2 
CE1-XHE-XE-SCRAM Operator fails to initiate manual scram 1.0E-2 1.0E-2 1.0E-2 
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Table 4. Expert subjective evaluation results. 
Basic event name Basic event failure possibilities justified by the experts 
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 
CE1-CBI-FF-PA,B,C,D 
CE1-CBI-FF-TA,B,C,D Reasonably High High Reasonably High High Reasonably High High Reasonably High 
CE1-CPA-FF-TA,B,C,D Very High Very High Very High Very High Very High Very High Very High 
CE1-CPR-FF-PA,B,C,D Reasonably High Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Reasonably High 
CE1-CTP-FF-CTA,B,C,D 
CE1-CTP-FF-HTA,B,C,D High Very High High Very High High Very High High 
CE1-MSW-FF-MT1,2 Moderate Reasonably High Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate High 
CE1-RYL-FF-LA,B,C,D–1,2,3,4 Reasonably High Reasonably High Reasonably High Reasonably High Moderate Reasonably High Reasonably High 
CE1-RYT-FF-ICM1,2,3,4 Reasonably High Moderate Reasonably High Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
CE1-CBI-CF-P(T)2OF3TM Reasonably Low Low Reasonably Low Low Low Very Low Low 
CE1-CBI-CF-P(T)3OF4 Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Moderate Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low 
CE1-CBI-CF-4OF6TM Low Low Low Reasonably Low Low Reasonably Low Moderate 
CE1-CBI-CF-6OF8 Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Low Low Low Low 
CE1-CPA-CF-T2OF3TM Reasonably High Reasonably High Reasonably High High Reasonably High Reasonably High Reasonably High 
CE1-CPA-CF-T3OF4 Moderate Moderate Moderate Reasonably High Reasonably High Moderate High 
CE1-CPR-CF-P2OF3TM Low Reasonably Low Low Low Moderate Reasonably Low Moderate 
CE1-CPR-CF-P3OF4 Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Low Reasonably Low Very Low 
CE1-CTP-CF-C(H)T2OF3TM Moderate Reasonably Low Moderate Reasonably Low Moderate Moderate Moderate 
CE1-CTP-CF-C(H)T3OF4 Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Moderate Moderate 
CE1-ROD-CF-RODS Low Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Low Reasonably Low Low 
CE1-RYL-CF-LM6OF12TM Very Low Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Low Very Low Low 
CE1-RYL-CF-LM12OF24 Low Low Very Low Low Low Low Low 
CE1-RYL-CF-1,2,3,4LM3OF3TM Low Reasonably Low Low Reasonably Low Low Very Low Reasonably Low 
CE1-RYL-CF-1,2,3,4LM6OF6 Low Low Reasonably Low Low Low Low Low 
CE1-RYT-CF-TR2OF4 
CE1-RYT-CF-2OF4 Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low Reasonably Low 
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5.   Result Analysis 
To show the effectiveness and the applicability of the new features implemented in 
InFaTAS-NuSA to overcome the limitation of conventional FTA, we compare four types 
of outputs generated by InFaTAS-NuSA to the ones generated by SAPHIRE, i.e. basic 
event probabilities as in Table 5, top event failure probability as in Table 6, minimal cut 
set importance measures as in Table 7, and basic event Fussell-Vesely importance 
measures as in Table 8. 
Table 5. Comparison of basic event probabilities. 
Basic event name 
Basic event probabilities in Relative 
error SAPHIRE InFaTAS-NuSA 
CE1-CBI-FF-PA,B,C,D 
CE1-CBI-FF-TA,B,C,D 5.0E-4 4.8E-4 0.045884 
CE1-CPA-FF-TA,B,C,D 7.6E-3 1.0E-3 0.864983 
CE1-CPR-FF-PA,B,C,D 1.1E-4 1.1E-4 0.040376 
CE1-CTP-FF-CTA,B,C,D 
CE1-CTP-FF-HTA,B,C,D 8.4E-4 8.3E-4 0.009576 
CE1-MSW-FF-MT1,2 1.3E-4 1.3E-4 0.035225 
CE1-RYL-FF-LA,B,C,D–1,2,3,4 2.6E-4 2.8E-4 0.092713 
CE1-RYT-FF-ICM1,2,3,4 1.2E-4 1.1E-4 0.046322 
CE1-CBI-CF-P(T)2OF3TM 2.6E-7 2.6E-7 0.004218 
CE1-CBI-CF-P(T)3OF4 7.2E-6 7.5E-6 0.047039 
CE1-CBI-CF-4OF6TM 1.7E-6 1.8E-6 0.047185 
CE1-CBI-CF-6OF8 7.7E-7 7.6E-7 0.013927 
CE1-CPA-CF-T2OF3TM 3.8E-4 3.8E-4 0.012703 
CE1-CPA-CF-T3OF4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 0.007939 
CE1-CPR-CF-P2OF3TM 5.0E-6 5.0E-6 0.006601 
CE1-CPR-CF-P3OF4 1.5E-6 1.5E-6 0.000282 
CE1-CTP-CF-C(H)T2OF3TM 3.7E-5 3.6E-5 0.019914 
CE1-CTP-CF-C(H)T3OF4 1.0E-5 9.2E-6 0.076792 
CE1-ROD-CF-RODS 8.4E-7 7.6E-7 0.096100 
CE1-RYL-CF-LM6OF12TM 1.6E-7 1.5E-7 0.031932 
CE1-RYL-CF-LM12OF24 4.3E-8 4.3E-8 0.010018 
CE1-RYL-CF-1,2,3,4LM3OF3TM 4.7E-7 5.1E-7 0.090759 
CE1-RYL-CF-1,2,3,4LM6OF6 2.0E-7 2.0E-7 0.013905 
CE1-RYT-CF-2OF4 4.8E-6 4.4E-6 0.089537 
 It can be seen from Table 5 that the greatest relative error of the basic event 
probabilities generated by InFaTAS-NuSA is less than 10%, which means that the 
generated probabilities are very close to the known probabilities, except for the basic 
event CE1-CPA-FF-TA, B, C, D.  This exception might be caused by the incapability of 
the fuzzy reliability algorithm implemented in InFaTAS-NuSA to generate basic event 
probabilities greater than 1.03E-03. To confirm and verify this incapability, two 
important issues need to be raised in future studies, i.e. the failure possibility distribution 
as well as their membership function definitions and the defuzzification technique. 
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Nevertheless, in general, the results have confirmed that the new features introduced into 
InFaTAS-NuSA are effective to deal with basic events whose reliabilities are 
characterized by qualitative justifications to overcome the limitation of conventional FTA 
for NPP PSA. These results also confirm that expert subjective evaluations can be in 
good agreement with the real quantitative probabilities collected from nuclear power 
plant operating experiences. 
Table 6. Top event failure probability and its sensitivity 
Failure probability SAPHIRE InFaTAS-NuSA 
Lower bound value (5%) 8.8E-7 4.5E-6 
Mean value 5.7E-6 5.2E-6 
Upper bound value (95%) 1.7E-5 9.0E-6 
 Meanwhile, the mean value generated by InFaTAS-NuSA is very much closer to the 
mean value generated by SAPHIRE as shown in Table 6. The difference of these values 
is caused by the difference in the basic event probabilities generated by InFaTAS-NuSA 
and the data directly input to SAPHIRE. However, the top event failure probability range 
generated by InFaTAS-NuSA is still inside the acceptable range of the system failure 
probability calculated by SAPHIRE.  
Table 7. Minimal cut set importance measures. 










CE1-RYT-CF-2OF4 4.80E-06 84.5% 4.37E-6 84.6% 
CE1-ROD-CF-RODS 8.40E-07 14.9% 7.59E-7 14.7% 
CE1-RYT-FF-ICM2*CE1-RYT-FF-
ICM1 1.40E-08 0.3% 1.31E-8 0.3% 
CE1-RYT-FF-ICM4*CE1-RYT-FF-
ICM3 1.40E-08 0.3% 1.31E-8 0.3% 
/CE1-RPS-TM-CHA*CE1-CBI-CF-
6OF8*CE1-XHE-XE-SCRAM 7.50E-09 0.1% 7.44E-9 0.1% 
/CE1-RPS-TM-CHA*CE1-RYL-CF-
LM12OF24*CE1-XHE-XE-SCRAM 4.20E-10 0.0% 4.17E-10 0.0% 
CE1-CBI-CF-4OF6TM*CE1-RPS-TM-
CHA*CE1-XHE-XE-SCRAM 2.80E-10 0.0% 2.85E-10 0.0% 
/CE1-RPS-TM-CHA*CE1-CBI-CF-
6OF8*CE1-MSW-FF-MT1 9.80E-11 0.0% 1.00E-10 0.0% 
/CE1-RPS-TM-CHA*CE1-CBI-CF-
6OF8*CE1-MSW-FF-MT2 9.80E-11 0.0% 1.00E-10 0.0% 
CE1-RPS-TM-CHA*CE1-RYL-CF-
LM6OF12TM*CE1-XHE-XE-SCRAM 2.50E-11 0.0% 2.48E-11 0.0% 
 Furthermore, Table 7 shows that the importance measures of the minimal cut sets 
generated by InFaTAS-NuSA are in the same order with the ones generated by 
SAPHIRE. The fact that the contribution percentage shown in this table equals to zero 
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does not mean that it is zero but that it is very small due to the round-off in the algorithm 
used. 
Table 8. Basic event Fussell-Vesely importance measures. 











 Table 8 shows the top ten basic events which contribute the most to the failure of the 
RPS of the Combustion Engineering PWR Group 1. Unfortunately, the details of this 
evaluation generated by SAPHIRE are not provided in Wierman et al.[13], but it was 
mentioned that the trips of CE1-RYT-FF-ICM1, CE1-RYT-FF-ICM2, CE1-RYT-FF-ICM3, and 
CE1-RYT-FF-ICM4 are four dominant contributors to the failure of this RPS, as also can 
be seen in Table 8. In this important measure, the ranking of the basic events is more 
important than the FV scores. 
6.   Conclusion and Further Research 
This study has developed InFaTAS-NuSA to overcome the limitations of the 
conventional fault tree analysis by introducing new features to deal with basic events 
whose reliability characteristics are represented by qualitative justifications. The 
introduction of the failure possibility distribution enables safety analysts to qualitatively 
characterize basic event reliabilities when they are not provided with quantitative 
probability distributions, which is needed in conventional fault tree analysis. 
Furthermore, the introduction of the fuzzy reliability algorithm enables safety analysts to 
evaluate reliability of a system by integrating qualitative information with quantitative 
data, which cannot be done in conventional fault tree analysis. The first model of the 
reactor protection system of the Combustion Engineering pressurized water reactor has 
been used to verify the effectiveness and applicability of the new features introduced into 
InFaTAS-NuSA. Four types of outputs, i.e. basic event probabilities, top event failure 
probability, minimal cut set importance measures, and basic event Fussell-Vesely 
importance measures, generated by InFaTAS-NuSA are benchmarked to the ones of the 
same system generated by SAPHIRE. The results of the benchmarking confirm that new 
features introduced into InFaTAS-NuSA can overcome the limitations of the 
conventional fault tree analysis for nuclear power plant probabilistic safety assessment. 
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 Based on the current results, we need to conduct more experiments to explore 
InFaTAS-NuSA’s features and enable future improvements and/or find new directions 
for development. 
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